LACEY MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

6/26/2014 10:15 PM

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
NICOLA LACEY*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 501
I. THE CONDITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY ................................................... 504
A. Ideas ..................................................................................................... 504
B. Interests ................................................................................................ 511
C. Institutions ............................................................................................ 513
II. THE SHIFTING ALIGNMENT OF IDEAS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN
THE VORTEX OF INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: A THESIS..... 517
III. DEVELOPING AND TESTING HYPOTHESES ABOUT WHAT
DRIVES PATTERNS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY .................... 520
IV. TESTING THE THESIS: THE VALUE OF COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS ............................................................................................... 525

INTRODUCTION
There is a rich tradition of scholarship in the areas of comparative
criminal law, comparative criminal procedure, and comparative criminal
justice policy and practice.1 But these literatures do not always speak to
one another, and they are unevenly related to comparative literature in the
social sciences. This lecture, in memory of Herbert L. Bernstein, makes a
case for studying comparative criminal law and criminal justice with close
reference to the distinctive cultural contexts and the particular institutional
settings in which rules and policies are developed and implemented in
different countries. Accordingly, both historical and political-economic
approaches are worthy of further development in this field and complement
the ambitions of the comparative method. Conversely, the comparative
method offers the most promising means of testing general hypotheses
emerging from historical and socio-legal studies.

Copyright © 2014 by Nicola Lacey.
* Professor of Law, Gender and Social Policy, London School of Economics. I am grateful to Arlie
Loughan for detailed comments on a draft of this paper and to the audience at the 2013 Bernstein
Lecture for a helpful discussion.
1. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986); THE
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW (Kevin Jon Heller & Markus D. Dubber eds., 2011).
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In a lecture devoted to comparative law, the area of criminal justice is,
today, a highly apposite focus. Notable shifts in many parts of the world
since the 1970s in the boundaries of criminalization and in the scope of
punishment and changes in the procedural protections surrounding the
application of nation states’ criminalizing and penal powers2 speak to some
very basic legal ideals: notably to the quality of the rule of law and to how
completely the values embodied in its tenets about the role of law in
mediating the relationship between individuals, groups, and the state are
realized. Increasingly, developments are also observable at a transnational
level, as supranational political and legal orders move into the business of
criminalizing and sanctioning states, corporations, and individuals.
But can comparative scholarship systematically shed light on criminal
law and criminalization in late modern societies? Or does national and
regional variation and variation across time and institutional levels rule out
a more synthetic or general project? As conceptions of crime and ideals of
legality are necessarily inflected by their specific origins in continental
European and Anglo-Saxon legal and political traditions, respectively, do
they invite a more particularistic treatment?
In building a case for an institutional approach to comparative legal
scholarship, I focus on the issue of criminal responsibility. My aim is to
provide an overview of the idea of responsibility in criminal law and its
development over time in English criminal law and to sketch a hypothesis
about what drives that development. Additionally, by applying a sociolegal methodology to the analysis of one concept in a particular system
over time, I aim to provide a case study of methodology in legal
scholarship more generally. I argue that this method is capable of
extension to a comparative context and also that the thesis developed in my
overview of English criminal law could most effectively be tested by
subjecting it to critical comparative examination. In developing this
method, I attempt to escape the narrowness of doctrinal scholarship by
aligning myself with a long line of traditions that resist the idea of legal
scholarship as autonomous and that insist on the importance of studying
law and legal practices in a social, historical, and institutional context: the
Process School in the United States, Law and Society and socio-legal
scholarship, and critical legal scholarship. Equally, however, I avoid
several unhelpful oppositions that have sometimes characterized critical or
2. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); Nicola Lacey, The Resurgence of
Character: Responsibility in the Context of Criminalization, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 151 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).
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socio-legal, cross-disciplinary studies of law by acknowledging a concern
with agency and structure, focusing on cultural and material forces as
important factors in the explanation of how law evolves and works,
exploring law’s autonomy while also attending to its heteronomy, and
recognizing the importance of intellectual and material history for
explaining the evolution of law.
My argument sets out from two very simple assumptions. First, I
assume that responsibility is best thought of as a set of ideas that play two
major roles in the development of modern criminal law: legitimation and
coordination. In other words, conceptions and elaborated doctrines setting
out the conditions of responsibility serve to legitimate criminal law as a
system of state power, this in turn being a condition for criminal law’s
power to coordinate social behavior, a task that it accomplishes in part by
specifying the sorts of information or knowledge that have to be proven in
the trial process precedent to conviction. Second, I assume that three main
aspects of its environment shape responsibility: ideas, interests, and
institutions. These three contextual aspects affect its conceptual contours
and its role or what is required of it.
I understand ideas as prevailing social narratives, knowledges and
understandings of the normative contours and significance of
responsibility. As such, ideas form the dominant frame for accounts of
criminal responsibility in the philosophy of criminal law and indeed in
standard doctrinal histories. They are, however, inadequate in themselves
to explicate the trajectory and significance of responsibility because they
are in turn shaped by, and have influence on, interests.
I understand interests as prevailing structures of power and their
dynamics (often legitimized by ideas). Interests in this sense form the
dominant explanatory frame in economic, political, and some legal history.
As such, they focus on the key influence on criminal law and
criminalization of patterns of social status and the distribution of wealth,
resources, social, and political voice and influence. Yet interests too are
both filtered through and shape institutions.
I understand institutions as the political system, economic institutions,
courts, trial process, and judicial system more generally (the legal
profession, the judiciary, the media, and other relevant professions—e.g.,
the police, prosecutors, and criminal justice officials of various kinds); the
civil service; the penal system; and, increasingly in many countries,
corporate interests. Many, though not all, of these institutions loom large
in criminal justice and political histories and in some (but by no means all)
legal histories. They both constrain and enable developments emerging
from ideas and interests. Yet their independent importance has been poorly
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incorporated into most criminal law (and indeed other legal) scholarship.
This is equally true, moreover, of much comparative scholarship, which has
also tended to focus largely on legal doctrines—a puzzling fact, given that
the different features of legal procedure that have attracted so much
comparative attention are realized through systematically different
institutional frameworks, which are themselves embedded in broader
institutional features of the relevant social and political systems.
I will therefore argue that an account premised on the coevolution of
these three spheres in the production of doctrines and practices of criminal
responsibility attribution is needed, one that assumes a mutually
constitutive relationship between these three broad spheres rather than
privileging any one of them. In other words, the underlying notion of a
responsible subject is shaped by an interlocking set of conditions that
change over time and place in tandem with factors such as the human
situation, prevailing ideas, institutions, and the distribution of power. This
implies that legal scholarship has to be historical and comparative in
outlook and located within a social, political, and economic framework if it
is to build a broad interpretation of the developing relationship between
concepts such as responsibility and the factors that explain their shifting
influence over time.
I. THE CONDITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
A. Ideas
A number of more or less discrete ideational frameworks for the
understanding of criminal responsibility have influenced English criminal
law over the last 250 years. Each of them is shaped by assumptions about
the nature of human (or corporate or indeed animal) agency, and each has
implications for the relationship between that agent and the state or other
body that wields criminalizing power, in particular for the accountability or
answerability of that agent and the conditions thereof. Two principal
questions arise: the question of legitimation, or what is seen as justifying
the calling to account of individuals or other bodies in the name of the
criminal process (or the state), and the question of coordination, or what
information must be marshaled to invoke that legitimated practice of
calling to account, including matters such as rules of evidence and
procedure and the substantive doctrines of criminal law.
Criminal responsibility has developed through four principal
ideational frames: capacity, character, harmful outcome, and risk.3 The
3. Nicola Lacey, Space, Time and Function: Intersecting Principles of Responsibility Across the
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underlying justification and legitimating narratives of these four frames are
philosophically distinct, and the frames draw on different political and
social knowledge and come in varied versions that hold greater or less
sway at different times. Yet they nonetheless can and do coexist in
particular systems of criminal law at particular times. After tracing the four
ideational frames, I will consider the question of how they relate to one
another in the development of English criminal law. I will do so by tracing
the changing interests, power, and distribution of resources that condition
these ideational frameworks and the institutional arrangements that
underpin them: not only criminal justice processes such as policing,
prosecution, trial, and proof but also broader social and political
institutions.
First, and most obviously, in modern legal discourse we are familiar
with the idea that criminal responsibility is founded in capacity. At the
heart of this vision of criminal responsibility sits the notion of an agent
endowed with powers of understanding and self-control.4 This notion was
most fully developed in post-Enlightenment social philosophy but existed
in thicker and thinner versions in earlier and later philosophies. It was
developed primarily in relation to human beings but was susceptible to
extension to, for example, corporate entities and animals. Under this
notion of capacity responsibility, respect for agency and individual freedom
is central. Capacity theories hence assume either freedom of the will or
some version of compatibilism, under which the idea that human conduct is
to some degree determined is not inconsistent with genuine responsibility.
Capacity responsibility implies a very stringent set of legitimating
requirements for state criminalization and punishment. Only when
criminal law is addressed to human beings as choosing subjects capable of
conforming their actions to the criminal law can it be compatible with
individual freedom.
Two significantly different legal versions of capacity responsibility
need to be distinguished. On one hand, there is capacity as choice, which
generally appears through subjective mens rea or fault requirements: legal
rules guarantee respect for agency by making intention, knowledge, or
foresight the paradigm conditions for criminal liability. On the other hand,
there is capacity as fair opportunity, which appears in a broader conception
of mens rea that includes negligence and “objective” recklessness: respect
Terrain of Criminal Justice, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 233 (2007).
4. See Nicola Lacey, In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social
Sciences in Criminal Law Theory, 64 MOD. L. REV. 350 (2001); Nicola Lacey, Responsibility and
Modernity in Criminal Law, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 249 (2001).
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for agency is satisfied so long as the agent has a fair chance to conform his
or her behavior to the requirements of criminal law. Both versions of the
capacity theory of responsibility also imply a generous panoply of defenses
encompassing circumstances under which the normal conditions of choice
or opportunity-taking are disrupted by external circumstances or the
behavior of third parties (or a combination of the two) and by exempting
conditions, such as forms of mental incapacity that deprive the agent of
minimum levels of cognitive and/or volitional power. A paradigm example
of capacity responsibility would accordingly be the case of someone who
intentionally causes grievous bodily harm to another. Excusing conditions,
such as duress, or exempting conditions, such as mental incapacity, further
refine the compatibility of doctrinal arrangements with the underlying
conception of responsibility.
Second, there is the notion of responsibility as founded in character,
itself an idea with diverse philosophical origins as different as Aristotelian
philosophy and its intellectual descendant, virtue ethics; Christian
doctrines; and the empiricism of David Hume.5 There are at least three
different senses in which assumptions about, or evaluations of, character
have informed attributions of responsibility in English criminal law. There
is the most fundamental sense of “character responsibility,” or the idea that
an attribution of criminal responsibility is in some sense a judgment of a
bad or vicious character and is legitimized by that fact. This sense of
character responsibility itself consists of two distinct components: a moral
or quasi-moral judgment and the projection of that moral judgment onto the
quality of individual character.
Character responsibility in this second sense occupies a rather wide
spectrum. The more robust senses of character responsibility invite us to
condemn not merely the sin—a judgment that could in itself be strongly
evaluative—but also, and fundamentally, the sinner. At its most extreme,
moreover, character responsibility proper exhibits “character essentialism”
and “character determinism.” In other words, it proceeds from a view—
theological or, increasingly in an era marked by secularization, scientific or
quasi-scientific—of human character or identity as fixed, or at least as
relatively stable, and it regards character as determining conduct. At the
other end of the spectrum, there is character responsibility as a view of
criminal conviction grounded in the manifestation of a vicious
characteristic or character trait or a disposition hostile to the norms of
criminal law, which might be out of character and which does not

5. See NICOLA LACEY, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CHARACTER: FROM MOLL FLANDERS TO TESS OF
(2008).

THE D’UBERVILLES 12–40
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necessarily mark a propensity to express such characteristics. Between
these ends of the spectrum, there are intermediate positions in which
criminal conduct expressing vicious characteristics gives rise to a stronger
or weaker presumption of bad character in the sense of propensity. The
impulse to move from an evaluation of conduct to the sort of evaluation of
character that marks the more extreme versions of character responsibility
has surfaced at key points in the history of English criminal justice.6 It has
large implications for the extent to which criminal law exhibits a
stigmatizing temper and for how much it is seen as addressing free and
equal subjects as opposed to managing a threat posed by particular
categories of subject, whether identified in terms of past behavior,
neuroscientific or psychological evidence, or otherwise. And the different
versions of character responsibility have, of course, different implications
in terms of the doctrinal preconditions of guilt (as well as for how it might
be proven): the mental states and choices that are central to the capacity
notion of responsibility continue to matter as evidence of or proxies for
features of character, expressed dispositions, neural conditions, or attitudes
hostile to the norms of criminal law. Thus, patterns of attribution founded
in character are concerned with judging the defendant within a distinctive
evidential and temporal frame.
Third, criminal law has not infrequently invoked a notion of outcome
responsibility, attributing responsibility primarily or purely on the basis of
the defendant having caused an outcome proscribed by the criminal law.
Here, the underlying philosophical frame is consequentialist: criminal law
is conceived as a distinctive system of regulation oriented to public harmreduction. Again, outcome responsibility comes in more and less stringent
forms. For example, pure causal responsibility, as in a doctrinal system of
absolute responsibility, founds its legitimating narrative not only in the
moral importance of causing harm but also in the idea that the effects we
cause in some sense become part of our identity.7 Even if we are less
responsible in one sense for an accidentally caused harm, such as injuring
someone after being jostled and losing one’s balance, most of us would
find it inappropriate if a person who had inadvertently caused harm in this
way simply shrugged his or her shoulders and said, “That has nothing to do
with me.” In practice, however, most outcome responsibility in criminal
law is less stringent than this, mitigating absolute liability by means of the
application of general defenses and/or of a specific “due diligence” or “no
negligence” defense. Alternatively, there is outcome responsibility in

6. Lacey, supra note 2.
7. See TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 14–40 (1999).
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terms of the special duties that attach to particularly dangerous activities,
such as driving cars and engaging in potentially harmful industrial
processes and other commercial activities.
Finally, and overlapping with both outcome responsibility and
character responsibility, there is responsibility as founded in risk. Again,
responsibility as risk comes in several different versions, with risk being
conceived in either clinical or actuarial terms. The idea of attaching
responsibility to clinical risk or pathology shades into the more extreme
versions of character responsibility. Risk-based responsibility also equates
to a more inchoate version of outcome responsibility and might indeed be
regarded as a product of the emergence of disciplines such as statistics or of
a range of medical techniques that enable, or purport to enable, the
prediction of outcomes.
Each of these four overlapping yet distinctive ways of thinking about
criminal responsibility have sounded in English criminal law over the last
250 years. But they themselves, and the relative influence that they hold
within the criminal law, have also been shaped by broader cultural ideas
that make up the environment in which ideas of responsibility develop.
Among these, the most salient include attitudes towards violence and
towards the proper relationship between the individual and the state; ideas
about democracy and forms of governance; beliefs about human nature,
specifically social Darwinism, eugenics, and early criminology, and about
sex and gender; and the process of secularization and the accompanying
decline in the significance of religious symbols in legitimating
criminalization and punishment.
Changes in legal ideas about
responsibility are the product of a much broader set of ideas about the self
and about relations between the self and society that significantly affect
both the legitimation challenges faced by criminal law and the
opportunities for legitimation and coordination that are available.8 Hence
they need to be contextualized within intellectual and social history. For
the purposes of this lecture, I will focus on just three of these broader ideas:
those about the nature of individual agency and the role of environment in
shaping subjectivity, the growth of the psychological and social sciences
since the mid-nineteenth century, and the emergence of utilitarian thinking.
First, ideas about the nature of individual agency and the role of
environment in shaping subjectivity are shifting over time and are at issue
in prevailing understandings of responsibility. In his exploration of the
“sources of the self,”9 Charles Taylor shows how the key elements of

8. See Lacey, supra note 5, at 25–34.
9. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989).
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modern individual selfhood—notably, the idea of selfhood as involving a
sense of inwardness—were assembled over many centuries, with marked
developments associated with Augustine, Descartes’ Cogito, and Locke’s
sensational psychology.10 Glimpses of a reflexive human self focused on
its own interior are visible in Shakespeare’s plays, in Montaigne’s essays,
and in innumerable diaries and letters of the early modern period. But,
Taylor argues, it continued to develop up to the philosophies of the
Enlightenment and indeed beyond.
Taylor focused his attention
exclusively on the development of ideas of selfhood within philosophical
texts, a focus which, as he acknowledged, omitted any assessment of the
social institutions within which these ideas evolve.
More recently, historian Dror Wahrman has investigated the
institutional context of Taylor’s argument, analyzing the “making of the
modern self” through a mesmerizing array of cultural practices, including
beekeeping manuals, novels, theater, fashion, portraiture, and translations
of the classics.11 Warhman argues that the Enlightenment philosophies of
the seventeenth century, most notably Locke’s view of the individual as
“tabula rasa” (to be shaped by experience) and the decline of faith in an
essential human nature located in a divinely ordered universe, gave birth to
a new and fluid conception and social practice of identity, whose defining
feature was that identity had to be created and assumed. As a social
construct, an individual could be modified through the adoption of different
clothes, different manners, or different associates. In the 1780s, this
external, socially constructed notion of selfhood began to be displaced by
the “modern regime of identity,” in which individual personhood is
believed to inhere in the unique and stable inner self that ultimately found
its most complete expression in Romanticism. While the older ideas of
identity resonated with the idea that responsibility attribution resides
primarily in the assessment of visible indices of character, the idea that the
self resides in an authentic psychological self implied a need to investigate
the interior world of the defendant as a means of assessing responsibility.
Only then did an investigation of the psychological interior become

10. Taylor’s is not a radically relativist position. In his account, core aspects of selfhood were
already in place in ancient Greek philosophy and have been in a process of development from this core
across the centuries, hence the recognizability to modern readers of figures like Moll Flanders. Id.
11. DROR WAHRMAN, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SELF: IDENTITY AND CULTURE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (2004). For other important works historicizing selfhood and
exploring the conditions under which emerging ideas of selfhood operate and by which they are
enabled, see REWRITING THE SELF: HISTORIES FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT (Roy Porter
ed., 1997); NIKOLAS S. ROSE, GOVERNING THE SOUL: THE SHAPING OF THE PRIVATE SELF (1990);
RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN (1977); PATRICIA MEYER SPACKS, IMAGINING A SELF:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND NOVEL IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1976).
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generally important to the legitimation of criminal law.
Second, the growth of the psychological and social sciences since the
mid-nineteenth century has been a key factor in the development of the late
modern idea of criminal responsibility founded in cognitive and volitional
capacity. The idea that criminal responsibility can be enunciated in terms
of states of mind—intention, foresight, belief, and so on—is premised on a
dualistic vision of a human being that can be traced to Descartes and on the
idea that the interior world of human individuals can be the object of social
knowledge and, indeed, of proof in a criminal court. In this context, the
development of what we now call psychology was of general assistance to
the development of the subjective theory of mens rea that is so influential
in English criminal law today.
This development pulled in different directions, however, which helps
to explain the slow, uneven, and incomplete development towards a
subjective notion of capacity responsibility. For example, the idea that the
subjective mental states of human beings could be the object of
investigation in a criminal court promised a “factualization” of criminal
responsibility that would make it less dependent on local knowledge or
shared evaluations and hence, crucially, less controversial.12 On the other
hand, it also threatened to undermine the project of developing a discrete
and technical, legal conception of criminal responsibility because it
appeared to assume a privileged position for medical and psychological
evidence. The well-documented turf wars between the judiciary and the
nascent psychiatric profession throughout the nineteenth century,13 the
continued place of older discourses of madness as manifest in the sense of
being recognizable to lay observers,14 and the persistence of value-laden
mens rea terms such as “maliciously” well into the twentieth century15 are
eloquent testimony to the courts’ concern with establishing their own
autonomous professional expertise and to their continuing commitment to
and confidence in the idea of legal judgment as evaluative rather than
factual or scientific. Moreover, the development of the social and human

12. See ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL
LAW 15–32 (2d ed. 2001).
13. See, e.g., NORRIE, supra note 12; ROGER SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN TRIALS (1981); Joel Peter Eigen, Lesion of the Will: Medical Resolve
and Criminal Responsibility in Victorian Insanity Trials, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 425 (1999).
14. See ARLIE LOUGHNAN, MANIFEST MADNESS: MENTAL INCAPACITY IN CRIMINAL LAW
(2012).
15. See Jeremy Horder, Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea, 113 LAW Q.
REV. 95 (1997) (discussing the historical and continuing importance of the principle of malice in
English criminal law); see also Lacey, supra note 4.
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sciences,16 most obviously those genetic or social Darwinian arguments
that appeared to undermine the idea of individual freedom and hence,
potentially, that of the capacity-based responsibility for crime, prompted
another interesting accommodation of character and capacity models in
criminal policy. It underpinned the frequent attempts from the 1860s on to
identify and subject to special, character-based policies certain groups of
offenders—habitual inebriates, habitual offenders, the weak-minded, the
vagrant, and the juvenile delinquent17—while assuming the existence of
freedom and hence capacity responsibility for other offenders.
Third, the emergence of utilitarian thinking, in both its pure
Benthamite form and in the modified form developed in John Stuart Mill’s
famous essay, On Liberty, had a key influence on conceptions of criminal
responsibility. As has been widely discussed, it became a powerful
impetus for law reform,18 but it also underpinned the powerful model of
rational agency that informed the emerging doctrines of capacity
responsibility. Additionally, it provided a harm-reduction framework to
legitimate the regulatory offenses that were emerging as key solutions to
the problems of rapid urbanization and industrialization.
B. Interests
Each of the ideational frames discussed are familiar to any student of
criminal law. But what determines which of these ideas prevails or
dominates, when, and over which aspects of criminal law? The
legitimation of criminal law depends on a discourse of justice, right, or
appropriateness, which, increasingly in democratic times, has come to
involve the idea that all are equal before the law. Yet the reality is that
criminal law is generally shaped by powerful interests: it is made by elites,
while it is disproportionately enforced against non-elites. The structure of
these patterns of interest and power have changed over time, however, with

16. See MARTIN J. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING THE CRIMINAL: CULTURE, LAW, AND POLICY IN
ENGLAND, 1830−1914, at 185−306 (1990); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to be Punished:
Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113 (1998) (arguing that
Enlightenment conceptions of autonomy have been lost from criminal law’s discourses of responsibility
since the turn to rehabilitation and scientific models).
17. See LEON RADZINOWICZ & ROGER HOOD, THE EMERGENCE OF PENAL POLICY IN VICTORIAN
AND EDWARDIAN ENGLAND 172−400 (1986); see also MARIANA VALVERDE, DISEASES OF THE WILL:
ALCOHOL AND THE DILEMMAS OF FREEDOM (1998) (discussing shifting Victorian conceptions of the
individual will in the context of alcohol policy); LUCIA ZEDNER, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CUSTODY IN
VICTORIAN ENGLAND 219−64 (1991) (discussing women specifically).
18. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAW REFORMERS: BECCARIA, BENTHAM, ROMILLY
(1923); K. J. M. SMITH, LAWYERS, LEGISLATORS AND THEORISTS: DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLISH
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 1800−1957 (1998).
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decisive consequences for doctrines and practices of criminal law. A full
discussion of the influence of these factors is beyond the scope of this
lecture, but it is useful to review the major factors in the development of
English criminal law.
Perhaps the most obvious form of power relevant to the development
of criminal law is political power. The modern period was, after all, an era
in which there was a steady growth of legislation as a source of English
criminal law and of the resort to criminalization as a tool of governance.
With the further development of the nation-state in the UK during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the modern project of governance
has grown in both complexity and intensity.19 As democratic institutions
gradually emerged and widened their scope, there was a decisive shift of
power from landowners to merchants and the emergence of an urban
bourgeoisie; at the turn of the twentieth century, with the development of
the party system, specifically the emergence of the Labour party, new
interests entered the political arena, along with significantly changing
demographics in the legislature. Given the rise of political power, criminal
law and criminal justice were liable to become objects of political contest.
This development occurred with particular intensity in the last decades of
the twentieth century, fostered by the system of winner-takes-all,
adversarial, majoritarian politics dominated by two main parties.20 The
politicization of criminal law through legislation’s gradual domination over
the common law implied shifting power relations between judges and
politicians, while the gradual emergence of criminal law as an object of
electoral competition rendered politicians’ approach to criminal
responsibility more and more relevant to how they attained and kept power.
Equally, if less directly, the distribution and scope of economic power
has important implications for patterns of criminal responsibility
attribution, as structural economic exclusion arguably renders patterns of
attribution based on stereotypes of bad character appealing. During the last
250 years, formal distinctions of status hierarchy based on class, gender,
and, later, ethnicity have gradually eroded, with important implications for
the distribution of symbolic or cultural power. Yet the persistence—and, in
19. See 5 S. E. FINER, THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES III: EMPIRES,
MONARCHIES, AND THE MODERN STATE (1997). For an account of the development of the
administrative apparatus of the British state and for an instructive refutation of the view that its
development is mainly to be attributed to the influence of Benthamite ideas, see Oliver MacDonagh,
The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal, 1 HIST. J. 52 (1958).
20. See LACEY, supra note 2 (discussing the implications of political systems for criminal
justice); see also Nicola Lacey, Political Systems and Criminal Justice: The Prisoners’ Dilemma After
the Coalition, 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 203 (2012).
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recent years, acceleration—of the gap between those in the top and middle
thirds of the distribution of wealth and those in the bottom third, many of
them trapped in intergenerational cycles of low education, poor housing,
and poverty, has arguably created a new form of status hierarchy: radical
inequality is closely associated with a de facto differential social status that
sits ill with ideals of legality. Yet more directly, the growth of professions
and the attendant emergence of professional power during the nineteenth
century had a key impact on criminal responsibility. Most notably, the
growth and increasing professionalization and power of the legal profession
provided both the incentive and the mechanism for the development of
refined legal doctrines of responsibility. Likewise, the growing power and
organization of a range of other professions (including the medical
profession, the “psy” professions, and the civil service)—each of which
were drawing on new knowledge in science, criminology, medicine,
statistics, demography, and other disciplines—has fundamentally changed
the conditions under which ideas of responsibility are formed and put into
practice.21 Yet, more obviously, specialized criminal justice professionals
emerged in this period: the police in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries; the welfare-oriented criminal justice professions, such as
probation officers, in the early twentieth century; and the experts in
assessing various kinds of risks in the latter part of the twentieth century.
In different ways, each of these organized and influential professions had
some impact on the development and implementation of conceptions of
responsibility. Last but not least, the growth of the power of the media has
undoubtedly had an impact on ideas of criminal responsibility and patterns
of responsibility-attribution, particularly in the media’s capacity to
legitimize and delegitimize particular ideas of responsibility in the criminal
process.
C. Institutions
The vectors of power just discussed do not, however, exist in the
abstract but rather work through institutional frameworks. The institutional
structures available for the realization of the legitimation and coordination
roles of criminal responsibility have changed over time and hence have
differently conditioned the ways in which those roles can proceed, both
constraining and providing opportunities. A vast range of institutions has
been directly or indirectly involved in the development of criminal
responsibility. During the period under consideration, the pretrial process
shifted from a system dominated by lay voices in the form of grand juries

21. See supra note 14.
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and justices, sometimes operating from their own homes, to a system
dominated by lawyers and police officers operating in police stations and
magistrates’ courts. The trial shifted from trial by altercation—an
institutional structure that, despite this description, involved an active role
for the judge reminiscent of the inquisitorial system on the continent of
Europe—to trial by lawyers, in which jury and judge became passive
decision-makers rather than active participants and defendants were
increasingly silenced.22 As the twentieth century passed, the rapid growth
of plea bargaining ushered in a significant (if not always acknowledged)
change in criminal procedure, implying as it did a decisive growth in
prosecutorial power and a more bureaucratized system. Legal training
shifted from oral tradition and social gatekeeping to formal gatekeeping
through an increasingly organized and increasingly regulated set of
professional structures. The police shifted from village constables to a
professional force whose relationship to political power itself changes over
time. The developing institutional form of the political system—the
structure and power of the legislature, its relationship with the executive
and the judiciary, the scope of the franchise, and the mechanisms for
registering votes and allowing votes to shape the development of the law—
are also of relevance. Moreover the structure and influence of the
professional bureaucracy, not only criminal justice professionals but also
welfare professionals and a range of civil servants whose advice is part of
the policy process, also affect the trajectory of ideas of criminal
responsibility.
By way of illustration, it is worth focusing on perhaps the most
obviously relevant institutional factor: the professionalization, expansion,
and autonomization of criminal law and the criminal process during the
nineteenth century, followed by the criminal justice system’s increasing
association with welfarist aspirations in the twentieth century and its
ultimate blending with risk-based modes of governance in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.23
Most histories of criminal law in the nineteenth century are dominated
by discussions of the long struggle to rationalize criminal law through
codification, represented by the reports of the various criminal law
commissions that have been established since 1833.24 None of these
attempts were successful, and the substantive criminal law of the 1900s,
22. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003).
23. Nicola Lacey, What Constitutes Criminal Law?, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 12, 29 (R. A. Duff et al. eds., 2013); see also DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A
HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES (1985).
24. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 18.
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though containing vast amounts of new legislation, was hardly more
coherent (according to the Commissioners’ criteria) than that of the 1800s.
The work of the Commissioners did, however, represent the first systematic
governmental attempt to give coherent form to the criminal law: to
explicate it as a body of doctrine in relation to certain general principles.
The rule of law ideals of rationality, coherence, and predictability that
informed these unsuccessful attempts and the Benthamite view of the
rational, deterrable subject of criminal law that underpinned them continue
to resonate in English criminal law nearly two centuries later. The
Benthamite model also implied a distinction between the deterrability of
those who committed offenses advertently and that of those who committed
them inadvertently—hence arguably providing the foundations for a
gradual elaboration of what we now understand as the distinction between
the subjective and objective forms of mens rea in criminal law.25
This impulse to systematize criminal law—to reconstruct it as a
coherent body of doctrine capable of being applied in an even-handed and
impersonal way26—is closely related to the developing project of modern
governance already discussed. Furthermore, two other contemporaneous
and more fully realized reform projects were also of significance to the
development of criminal law in this period. These were the centralization
and professionalization of enforcement27 and penal processes28 and the
articulation of rules of criminal evidence. Each of these changes expressed
a need to autonomize criminal justice by specifying distinctive personnel,
institutions, processes, responses, and special kinds of knowledge that
came within its purview. For example, the specification of distinctive rules
for assessing and filtering evidence received from the social world imply a
very basic change in conceptions of knowledge and proof: the move
towards an adversarial trial as the best process for the discovery of truth
marked a gradual move away from a system in which jury perceptions via
common sense, local knowledge, the testimony of witnesses, and the

25. See SMITH, supra note 18, at 67–123. In contemporary criminal law doctrine, a subjective
principle of fault is one that judges the defendant in terms of his or her own beliefs, capacities,
intentions, and so on, while an objective principle judges the defendant in terms of the beliefs,
capacities, or intentions that a reasonable person would have had in the circumstances. See NICOLA
LACEY & CELIA WELLS, RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 39–47 (2d ed.
1998).
26. See Randall McGowen, The Image of Justice and Reform of the Criminal Law in Early
Nineteenth-Century England, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 89 (1983).
27. See, e.g., DAVID PHILIPS, CRIME AND AUTHORITY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE BLACK
COUNTRY 1835–1860 (1977).
28. See RADZINOWICZ & HOOD, supra note 17.
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statement of the defendant was the best source of proof.29 Furthermore, the
development of legal representation in the criminal courts, accelerated by
the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836, which entitled, for the first time, all
defendants to be represented by lawyers at every stage of the trial,
including the address to the jury, led to a significant professionalization of
criminal legal practice.30 Finally, the gradual development of systematic
law reporting and, significantly later, a system of criminal appeals,
provided further foundations for the development of a rationalized system
of criminal law doctrine.31 Each of these forces can reasonably be inferred
to have militated in favor of the gradual development of technical
conceptions of responsibility articulated in terms that did not rely on
shared, lay evaluations.
The institutions that affected the course of criminal responsibility were
not confined to those of the criminal process or even the political process,
however. For example, industrialization and urbanization32 fundamentally
altered the resources available for the criminal justice system to coordinate
and legitimate judgments of responsibility. Greater social mobility—in
both the geographical and socioeconomic senses—weakened the local basis
for judgments of character and reputation and complicated the shared
evaluation of serious wrongs that had arguably underpinned the relatively
restricted criminal justice system in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.33 As the regulatory ambitions of the state increased and as the
expansion of summary jurisdiction and the explosion of regulatory offenses
from the mid-century on facilitated the pursuit of these ambitions through
the criminal justice system,34 these problems of legitimation and
29. See J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660–1800, at 634 (1986) (tracing
the emergence of the criminal standard of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the law of evidence
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); DAVID J. A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING
OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL 1800–1865 (1998); J. M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense
Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST.
REV. 221 (1991).
30. See CAIRNS, supra note 29, at 126−76 (detailing the effects of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act).
31. SMITH, supra note 18, at 42−54, 361−68.
32. See BEATTIE, supra note 29, at 637; J. J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY IN THE
19TH CENTURY (1967); Beattie, supra note 29; Bruce Lenman & Geoffrey Parker, The State, the
Community and the Criminal Law in Early Modern Europe, in CRIME AND THE LAW: THE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF CRIME IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1500, at 11, 38 (V. A. C. Gatrell et al. eds., 1980).
33. THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200–1800 (1985) (arguing that under the “communitarian view” the
jury’s operation in the later modern period was grounded in a high level of consensus about the central
norms governing offences against the person and against property—a consensus that did always not
extend to political cases such as treason—and about the indices of character and reputation that
rendered the application of the capital sentence unjust).
34. See LINDSAY FARMER, CRIMINAL LAW, TRADITION AND LEGAL ORDER: CRIME AND THE
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coordination became ever more intense. As confidence in substantive
evaluations of character diminished, demands for legitimation increased.
Therefore, the criminal process was in search of a conception of criminal
responsibility that could be explicated in legal, technical terms and hence
legitimated as a form of specialist knowledge underpinning an impersonal
mode of judgment.35 The full articulation of such a system depended,
however, on a number of other institutional features that developed
gradually from the late eighteenth century on: an adversarial trial
dominated by lawyers, a sophisticated law of evidence, and a further
professionalization of legal practice. In short, interests and ideas shaped
these institutional changes, along with many others, yet they also shaped
the way in which those ideas could be expressed and those interests
pursued.
II. THE SHIFTING ALIGNMENT OF IDEAS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN
THE VORTEX OF INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: A THESIS
I have argued so far that, while the apparently competing ideas of
criminal responsibility reviewed earlier can and do coexist in criminal law,
their alignment and relative influence changes over time. Moreover, we
should see those shifting alignments as a reflection of systematic changes
in interests and institutional dynamics, fundamentally affecting the nature
and scope of criminal law as a system of social meaning creation and social
governance. If this broad approach is right, approaches to legal scholarship
that place emphasis on the autonomy of law are fundamentally
misconceived. While legal doctrines and ideas have a certain independent
force, with the closure of legal reasoning providing a certain insulation for
legal ideas, the larger intellectual, institutional, and interest-based
environment has a decisive bearing on the changing shape of legal concepts
over time.
How then might we characterize, schematically for the purposes of
this lecture, the trajectory of criminal responsibility in modern English
criminal law? I would like to suggest that there has been a broad move
through four configurations of responsibility from the early eighteenth to
the early twenty-first century. In the eighteenth century, the terrain of
responsibility was dominated by the pattern of attribution based on
evidence or assumptions about bad character (in particular the malice
principle in the common law). Capacity in its subjective sense was shaping

GENIUS OF SCOTS LAW, 1747 TO THE PRESENT 57−99, 119 (1997) (discussing summary jurisdiction and
character evidence at the start of the nineteenth century).
35. See McGowen, supra note 26, at 89.
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the slow development of defenses (notably the emergence of emotional
distress defenses) and the attribution of responsibility in some of the most
serious offenses, notably murder and treason. And outcome responsibility
was on the margins, often manifesting itself in local regulation of particular
activities through bylaws and specific legislation, such as the memorably
named “Bumboat” Acts.36 As I have argued in more detail elsewhere,37
this configuration reflects both opportunities for and limits on legitimation
and coordination within a non-democratic political system, a society
structured by status hierarchy, and a decentralized social order whose
institutions of both informal and formal social control were situated
importantly at the local level and in lay hands.
With ever greater centralization, professionalization, and
systematization during the nineteenth century and with the diffusion of
democratic ideas about individual agency and more psychological views of
human subjectivity, the patterns and principles of attribution based on
capacity were strengthened and refined. Additionally, the patterns and
principles based on character declined as autonomous forces, though they
did continue to shape decision-making at the prosecution and sentencing
stages. They also became intertwined in interesting ways with notions of
capacity. Since the early nineteenth century, the growth of centralized state
power and the increasing ambition of the state’s governance of its
population has given rise to a certain confidence in the possibility of
shaping the habits and dispositions of citizenship through the development
of institutions such as criminal justice, the poor law, and later education
and health systems. This at first effected an interesting compound of
moralism and utilitarianism in criminal policy and of character and
capacity as bases for criminal responsibility.38 In the early nineteenth
century, the English state explicitly thought of criminal law as a key
character-building institution. Within both utilitarian and evangelical
traditions, subjects were assumed to be capable of shaping their characters
according to the secular or religious incentive system provided by a
reformed, rationalized criminal law and by the disciplinary framework of
the modern prison—and hence to become law-abiding citizens. This was a

36. Bruce P. Smith, The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750–1850, 23 LAW
& HIST. REV. 133 (2005).
37. See LACEY, supra note 5; Lacey, supra note 2, at 151–78.
38. See JOHN BENDER, IMAGINING THE PENITENTIARY: FICTION AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE
MIND IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1987) (discussing the notion of character informing the
penitentiary movement); FARMER, supra note 34, at 119; RADZINOWICZ & HOOD, supra note 17, at
35−36 (addressing the role of character in the shaping of social policy); WIENER, supra note 16, at 14–
158.
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project of modernization in the service of moralization. Changing social
and political structures posed new challenges for the criminal process,
however. In an increasingly, albeit tentatively, democratic political culture
that moved slowly towards the idea of universal citizenship, the question of
whether the conviction and punishment of the free individual could be
justified became increasingly pressing as the liberal ideas, most vividly
expressed in J.S. Mill’s On Liberty, infused political sensibilities, altering
the structure of the legitimation problems facing government.39 Both the
expansion and the increasing secularization of governmental authority
accentuated the legitimation problems faced by the criminal justice system.
At the same time, patterns and principles based on outcome began to
occupy a larger terrain as a result of the growing regulatory ambitions of
the nation state, notably in the expansion of summary jurisdiction,
facilitating the implementation of criminal law in areas such as factory
legislation and licensing.40
Character principles and patterns experienced a limited but important
revival with the emergence of ideas of social and psychological pathology
in the latter part of the nineteenth century. But they were gradually
modified by their association with welfare principles: criminal justice
assumed a capable, responsible subject whose agency was susceptible to
being deployed in the service of ameliorative projects premised on reform,
rehabilitation, and efforts at social inclusion, albeit within a still relatively
hierarchical system of social ordering. With the growth of organized legal
education, including universities, and the consequent diffusion of
systematic texts and treatises, the idea of capacity responsibility assumed
dominance in the first half of the twentieth century41 alongside a continuing
edifice of outcome-based practices grounded in a parallel, and very
different, set of legitimating principles and coordinating practices.
Moreover, the line between the objects of regulation encompassed by
capacity and outcome practices has never been stable; both drug and traffic
offenses are good examples of areas in which no clear line between
regulatory and core terrains can be drawn.42 The two ideational and
practical worlds were, however, related via the fair opportunity version of
the capacity principle, in the form of both negligence offenses (such as

39. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press
2003).
40. See FARMER, supra note 34, at 57–99.
41. See Lacey, supra note 23.
42. The radical instability of the distinction between “real” and “regulatory” crime was brought
into sharp relief in the late twentieth century by persistent moral panics about serious offenses in the
areas of fraud, tax evasion, and insider trading.
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involuntary manslaughter) in the “core” of criminal law and due diligence
offenses (such as health and safety offenses, either premised on proof of
lack of due diligence or subject to a due diligence defense) on the periphery
of regulatory offenses based on harmful outcomes. The existence of both
groups of offenses has moreover implied a struggle between objective and
subjective forms of capacity-based mens rea, finding significant expression
in appellate cases in the last third of the twentieth century.
This dual system began to be disrupted in the latter part of the
twentieth century with the increasing politicization of criminal justice and
an intensified focus on insecurity.43 This period accordingly saw the
emergence of a new alignment of principles, with capacity responsibility
still occupying a secure role among core criminal offenses but a new
discourse of responsibility founded in the presentation of risk promoting a
hybrid pattern and practice of responsibility based on a combination of
putative outcome and a new sense of bad character, not as religiously
inflected sinfulness but rather as the status of presenting risk or being
“dangerous.”44 Arguably driven not only by the feelings of insecurity
associated with life in late modern societies45 but also by rapidly
developing technologies of risk assessment in medicine, psychiatry,
geography, and demography, this pattern has been particularly evident in
the areas of both terrorism and drug regulation, in the de facto revival of
status offenses, and in the construction of a vast area of preventive justice
through the expansion of inchoate and the creation of “pre-inchoate”
offenses.46
III. DEVELOPING AND TESTING HYPOTHESES ABOUT WHAT
DRIVES PATTERNS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
How, finally, might we make sense of these shifting patterns in the
English system? Consider the following model, which may be oversimplified but perhaps suggestive. A pattern of responsibility attribution
based on character made a great deal of practical and cultural sense in an
environment that was stable, relatively homogeneous, non-democratic, and
based on status hierarchy. Furthermore, in that environment, the state had
limited ambitions and capacities but was able to draw on considerable local
resources of knowledge, norm enforcement, and regulation. Local
43. See LUCIA ZEDNER, SECURITY (2009); Lacey, supra note 2.
44. Id.
45. ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE
MODERN AGE (1991).
46. See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the
Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, and Sanctions, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 21, 21−51 (2008).
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knowledge provided evidence of character in relation to insiders. Although
the wandering mobility of the poor was long regarded as a significant
social problem to be curtailed by the town watch and the structure of the
poor law, the simple fact of being an outsider carried with it a stigma of
presumptive criminality. Character evidence was key to the conduct of the
trial, criminality was readily associated with status (an association also
reflected in stigmatizing physical punishments that left marks on the body),
criminal prosecution was based on an assumption of bad character, and
criminal conviction gave an official imprimatur to that assumption.47
With a move to a more individualized, mobile, anonymous, and
democratic world, the shape of legitimation and coordination problems
changed. The subject of criminal law gradually became a rights-bearing
agent, entitled to be judged in terms of his or her own particular capacities,
intentions, and knowledge.48 At the same time, local resources for
knowledge coordination diminished, and a formalized system of policing
and criminal trials had to be gradually constructed to facilitate gathering
evidence necessary for trial. Furthermore, the gradual domination of the
trial by lawyers allowed the refinement of technical doctrines of
culpability, as the prevailing legal and political culture, influenced by
Enlightenment conceptions of agency and utilitarian theories of human
psychology, attached special importance to individual mental states.49 This
psychological and essentially factual view of responsibility diverted
attention from any contested issues of values in an environment that
urbanization, social mobility, and democratization were already rendering
less morally homogeneous.
This trajectory—at least across the terrain of “serious” criminal law—
towards an advertence-based standard of responsibility proceeded relatively
smoothly due to the creation of many strict liability regulatory offenses,
which allowed the emerging state to pursue its instrumental goals cheaply
and efficiently, and to the extraordinary success of the early Victorian
state’s creation of a modern criminal justice system featuring, in particular,
a regular police force and an extensive prison system.50 Crime, especially
in the rapidly expanding cities, became a serious social concern. But this
spurred further institutional innovation. In a fascinating amalgam of
character and capacity cosmologies, the penal system of the first two-thirds
of the nineteenth century organized itself to shape convicts’ own capacities

47.
48.
49.
50.

LACEY, supra note 5, at 34–40.
Id. at 51–97.
SMITH, supra note 18.
RADZINOWICZ & HOOD, supra note 17.
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to work on their characters as declining crime rates fostered the perceived
legitimacy and effectiveness of the gradually modernizing system.51
But, as the case of the regulatory offenses reveals, this move towards
the investigation of individual capacity responsibility was never complete,
not least because the costs of fully realizing the ideal of capacity
responsibility proven beyond a reasonable doubt would have been
prohibitive, even had the newly created criminal justice infrastructure been
extensive enough to deliver it. Shortcuts to proof, such as the presumption
that a defendant has intended the natural consequences of his or her actions,
and indeed more radical reversals of the purportedly inviolate presumption
of innocence expressed in the usual burden of proof remained important,
even in relatively peaceful and optimistic times. In more difficult periods,
when the costs of determining individual capacity responsibility were
particularly high (for example, because of the scale of perceived crime
problems), the shortcuts seemed particularly tempting. And such shortcuts
tended to be nested, explicitly or implicitly, within a legitimating
framework of criminal character shaped by scientific or religious doctrines.
Hence, the historical trajectory towards proof of individualized capacity
responsibility was not unbroken. For example, in the wake of widespread
economic insecurity during an extended recession and the cultural anxieties
over the first hints of the collapse of the British Empire and the Fenian
challenge in Ireland from the 1870s through the 1890s, governments
reverted to a concern with the idea of criminal types who might be targeted
and identified, with consequent improvements to public safety. In a
frightening time, the quasi-Darwinian, eugenic view of crime as pathology
gave birth to a new conception of criminal character, a scientific character
essentialism, and appeared in legislative arrangements that identified
particular criminal classifications with the goal of separating and managing
a distinct criminal class.52 The epitome of this moment is Lombroso’s
criminology, with its fantasy of the existence of stable types of criminal
character and of being able to identify those types in terms of
physiognomy, and Francis Galton’s equally vivid fantasy that by
superimposing many photographs of offenders he would be able to identify
the essence of criminal personality.53

51. See WIENER, supra note 16.
52. See ZEDNER, supra note 17.
53. See Nicola Lacey, Psychologising Jekyll, Demonising Hyde: The Strange Case of Criminal
Responsibility, 4 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 109 (2010) (arguing that the Darwinist form of these character
classifications was juxtaposed against a revived concern with criminality based in “evil”: a concern
vividly reflected in contemporary fiction, including Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, and Bram Stoker’s Dracula).
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With the resolution of the economic and social crisis in the 1890s,
positivist criminology was, at least in England, gradually consigned to the
academy rather than the prison or reformatory. Criminal types legislation
gradually fell into disuse, and at the turn of the century, there gradually
assembled the political, institutional, and procedural bases for the “penal
welfarist” settlement, which endured until the 1970s, sustained by a
relatively stable social culture that had perhaps been fostered by the First
and Second World Wars.54 And just as the penal system was being
reconstructed on more reformist and inclusionary lines, so were capacitybased and subjective principles of responsibility continuing their steady
progress in the courts and the legislature during the major part of the
twentieth century. They found their intellectual acme in Glanville
Williams’s Criminal Law: The General Part55 and their fullest legislative
support in Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, which, by effectively
reversing Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith,56 finally and decisively
abandoned the presumption that natural consequences are intended.
As many commentators have argued,57 this penal welfarist settlement
began to break down in the early 1970s, under pressure from increased
crime and a welter of economic, demographic, and cultural changes that
were fundamentally altering the structure of criminal justice politics in the
UK and in many other countries, including the United States. This is not
the place to rehearse the familiar story of how, amid a “culture of control,”
penal welfarism gave way to increasing punitiveness: to “penal populism,”
creating a “prisoners’ dilemma” for politicians and a tendency to “govern
through crime.”58 The power of the narrative is, sadly, attested to in the
soaring imprisonment rates in the liberal market economies that have seen
this trend. I suggest that these factors, charted so persuasively by
criminologists in relation to criminal justice arrangements such as policing
and punishment, also explain the changing patterns and principles of
criminal responsibility charted in the previous section, in particular the
reemergence of patterns of attribution based on a version of character

54. GARLAND, supra note 23.
55. GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (1953). At the turn of the
century, one of the most influential texts was still conflating objective and subjective mens rea
standards, blurring the boundary between the two. COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, OUTLINES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 40 (1902).
56. [1961] A.C. 290 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
57. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 2; JOHN PRATT, PENAL POPULISM (2006); ROBERT REINER,
LAW AND ORDER: AN HONEST CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CRIME AND CONTROL (2007); JOCK YOUNG, THE
EXCLUSIVE SOCIETY: SOCIAL EXCLUSION, CRIME AND DIFFERENCE IN LATE MODERNITY (1999).
58. LACEY, supra note 20; JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
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aligned with a new conception of risk. The example of the late Victorian
criminal types legislation—the feeble-minded, the inebriate, the vagrant,
and the fallen woman59—is hence a real clue to the explanation for waxing
and waning patterns of character responsibility. Amid a crisis of security
analogous to that experienced at the end of the nineteenth century,
legislators today are reaching for definitions and mechanisms that can
reassure an anxious public that their concerns are being taken seriously and
that “the criminal threat” can be contained. The construction of criminal
classifications is a tempting mechanism, and just as the late nineteenth
century classifications reflected prevailing anxieties, scientific theories, and
technologies, so today’s categories—the anti-social youth, the sex offender,
the migrant and, above all, the terrorist—are appropriate symbols of
“otherness” relative to contemporary anxieties and technologies.
These anxieties and the technologies available to meet them have of
course changed. In the wake of the collapse of Fordism, the partlyassociated attenuation of social solidarity, and the dilution of the welfare
state, and amid an economic crisis that seems likely to further intensify
concerns about insecurity that have underpinned developments such as the
readmissibility of character evidence and the invention of what amounts to
a new generation of criminal status offenses, there is reason to fear that
those who form easily identifiable objects of anger, fear, or resentment will
find themselves increasingly the target for what we might call characterfacilitated criminal responsibility-attribution. Non-citizens in general and
recent immigrants and asylum seekers more specifically are obvious
potential targets, particularly where their origins may be associated in
popular or police consciousness with either terrorism or drug production.60
More speculatively and potentially more nightmarishly, new technologies
in fields such as neuroscience and genetics, and computer programs that
identify crime “hot spots” that might be taken to indicate “postcode
presumptive criminality” have potential implications for criminal
responsibility. They will offer, or perhaps threaten, yet more sophisticated
mechanisms of responsibility attribution based on notions of character
essentialism, just as the emerging sciences of the mind, the brain, and
statistics did in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, several of these new
scientific classifications exhibit more extreme forms of character

59. ZEDNER, supra note 17, at 219–96.
60. Lucia Zedner, Security, the State, and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of Crime
Control, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 379 (2010); see also ALESSANDRO DE GIORGI, RE-THINKING THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUNISHMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON POST-FORDISM AND PENAL POLITICS (2006);
Loĭc Wacquant, “Suitable Enemies”: Foreigners and Immigrants in the Prisons of Europe, 1
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 215 (1999).
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essentialism than did their nineteenth century forbears.
IV. TESTING THE THESIS: THE VALUE OF COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
This is a broad hypothesis, but it is based in a rich array of facts about
the trajectory of criminal responsibility in a single system. How might the
robustness of the hypothesis be tested? The most obvious means is through
a comparative analysis that sets the argument about the development of
criminal responsibility in the jurisdiction of England and Wales on a
similar trajectory to that in other countries with which it shares enough
fundamental features to be broadly comparable but that feature a range of
institutional and ideational differences and variation in the shape and
distribution of interests that will allow us to assess the relative force of the
different dynamics. How might such a comparative analysis be made
manageable? One approach is to develop a detailed comparison of a
limited sample of countries, combining analysis of their current penal
policies with analysis of their practices of legal responsibility attribution in
selected areas of criminalization, such as homicide (representing the
paradigm case of serious crime and susceptible of relatively straightforward
comparison), drug criminalization, and public order offenses (both areas
sitting on the cusp between serious and regulatory offenses, each a key
focus of recent political concern and legislative activity in many countries),
framing these within a broad comparative political economy of crime and
control.
The UK, Germany, and the United States would represent a good
sample for a number of reasons. First, while the UK and the United States
are “liberal market economies,” with competitive, adversarial, first-pastthe-post electoral systems and increasingly flexible economies, Germany is
a “coordinated market economy,” with a consensus-oriented, proportionally
representative political system and high long-term investment in education
and training, leading to a higher skills economy with, at least until very
recently, high levels of employment stability.61 Second, while Germany
has a civil law system, the UK and the United States have common law
systems. This combination allows for the exploration of the impact of the
type of a country’s political economy and of whether a distinctive legal
system and procedure has an independent importance. Third, by focusing
closely on the interlocking institutional arrangements in the UK and the

61. See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES
CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall &
David Soskice eds., 2001).
OF
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United States—countries that belong to the same political economy and
legal families yet display differences and similarities in recent criminal
policy—one could begin to explore further factors that may explain these
intra-family differences. An obvious candidate for exploration would be
the political system, which (as already mentioned) functions in importantly
different ways in the two countries. Fourth, this group of case studies
would allow us to give particular consideration to the influence of legal or
constitutional variables such as the distribution of power; the scope of
constitutional constraints on criminalization; the appointment, tenure, and
accountability structure of key officials such as judges; and the existence
and form of codification.
The three cases are particularly suitable for exploring legal variables
because they encompass a large number of possibly significant differences.
The UK has a substantially “unwritten” constitution and lacks a fully
federal structure, while the relationship between the criminal jurisdictions
of Scotland and of England and Wales provide a focus for investigating
intra-country regional variation. Both the United States and Germany have
written constitutions and strong traditions of judicial review, but their
constitutions imply different constraints on criminal legislation, and
judicial review in Germany is restricted to a special constitutional court.
Moreover, the two federal systems work in very different ways. For
example, whereas in Germany, criminal law is primarily a federal matter,
in the United States, federal jurisdiction, though important, is
circumscribed; states enact and enforce the vast majority of criminal law,
and regional differences in criminal law and punishment are substantial.62
In addition, each country has an entirely different system for the
appointment and tenure of judges. Whereas many state judges are elected
in the United States, British judges are appointed by the Judicial
Appointments Commission, and German judges are, in effect, civil
servants: career professionals who train specifically for the judicial role.
Finally, while codification has never been achieved in the UK, both
Germany and the United States have codified criminal law, to different
extents and in different forms.
In effect, I am calling for a socio-legal comparative law, grounded in a
social theory and in political economy. Within the framework of a single
lecture, itself focused on the elaboration of a particular case study, the case
that I have made for this approach is necessarily schematic. I hope

62. On regional variation across the United States, see, for example, VANESSA BARKER, THE
POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES
OFFENDERS 25–46 (2009).
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nevertheless that I have said enough to indicate the attractions of this
approach and the special contribution that comparative scholarship might
make to it. I trust that in doing so, I have articulated an aspiration of which
Herbert Bernstein would have approved.

